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Parallel Media Response To
Racial Policies In Malaysia
And New South Africa
Some striking parallels have emerged between post-colonial Malaysia
and South Africa in terms of theirsocial policies and political discourse
andthemedia's response to these policies anddiscourses. The Bumiputera
policy asdeveloped in Malaysia in the1970'sseems tohavebeen exported
to 1990'5 South Africa where it is called affirmative action. This paper
traces the roots of these two contemporary race-based policies back to a
joint experience of British imperialism and examines the implications
such race-based socioeconomic policies seem to holdfor the media and
media workers. Journalists andmedia trainers are challenged toconsider
ways in which the media can respond to such policies.
P.Erie Louw
Charles Sturl University· Bathurst
A s we approach the end of the twentieth century, there arestill states where race lies at the very heart of social-policy.
Two such contemporary societies are Malaysia and South Africa.
It is no accident that both these states are products of the British
Empire. The British arrived in Malaysia in 1786 and in South
Africa in 1795. Two centuries later the negative effects of the
introduction of Anglocentric logic into these regions are still being
felt by the inhabitants of these two societies.
Malaysia's Bumiputera policy and South Africa's
affirmative action policy both have their roots in the way the
British economically organised and racially ranked many of their
colonies. Such societies appear to throw up some dilemmas for
journalists - for journalists living in such societies it creates one
set of problems; for outside journalists another. But before looking
at the media's relationship to such race-based societies, let us first
attempt to unravel the nature and origins of such racial policies.
Such an unravelling is necessary because there can be no sensible
discussion of media ethics in much of the Afro-Asian world
outside of an engagement with the racist past and present of
societies like Malaysia and South Africa.
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The English are characteristically a class-conscious people.
In building their empire they carried their class consciousness with
them, but conflated it with race when ranking their new colonial
societies. The result was a race ranking system. In the Empire's
new social formations, one's life-chances were to be determined
by one's ethnic status.
Hence, in British-South Africa, for example, the following
class-race ranking emerged. British-born Anglos constituted the
social elite. Next down in the social ranking order came Anglos
born in the colonies. Next came non-Anglo whites (i.e, Afrikaners).
Then came Indians and coloureds (mixed-race people). Next came
the "mission blacks" (black people who were Westernised and
able to speak English; called half-baked kaffirs)J, and finally all
other blacks (called Airs). The "other black" category was itself
ranked, with some tribes being considered "superior" because they
had "fought bravely" (which was seemingly important for a
"martial race" like the English). For example the Zulu and Matabele
were judged "superior" to the Tswana or Shona. It was a ranking
naturalised by the Anglo-colonial media not only in South Africa,
but throughout the Empire.
But a key feature of this British Empire race ranking system
was what Donald Horowitz has called "positional psychology"
(Horowitz, 1985:184). In other words, racial ranking allocated
group worth. Within the colonial system there were what Horowitz
called "backward" and "advanced" groups, and one's worth as an
individual was ascribed according to the ethnic group one was
born into.
Ultimately, the Anglo media (whether in London, Sydney,
Johannesburg, Singapore, Toronto or New Delhi) all circulated the
same Empire-wide colonial race-ranking system -- a world view
that justified English rule over an Empire of lesser human types.
And echoes of this worldview can still be heard throughout the
Anglo world -- hence, race-ranking may no longer be "politically
correct" (and hence openly practised) in Anglo-derived societies
like Australia and the USA, but at a deeper level the old rankings
still resonate powerfully in Anglo hearts.
As Horowitz said, " ... the colonialists thus set in motion a
comparative process by which aptitudes and disabilities imputed
to ethnic groups were to be evaluated... [and] .. the evaluations
took hold ... [so that] ... no one emerged from colonial rule
untouched by the new standards of group evaluation" (Horowitz,
1985: 154). To be born a white Anglo was to see oneself and be
seen by others as automatically superior and "advanced". To be
born Malay or a black South African was to be automatically
"backward". While to be born Chinese (in Malaysia) or Afrikaans
(in South Africa) was to be allocated to an intermediary position -
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not as "advanced" as Anglos, but not as "backward" as Malays or
blacks. Anglos saw the Chinese as "cleverer" and "more
industrious" than Malays. They saw Afrikaners as "honorary
Europeans"; slightly "better than kaffirs It, but somehow tainted
by their long association with Africa. It was an Anglo
manufactured ascribed ranking that determined not only one's
economic life chances, but also ultimately affected one's self-
perception of how worthy one was. It was a social order in which
non-Anglos could never feel fully "worthy" -- thus, even elite
Malays or elite Afrikaners allowed to enjoy powerful political or
bureaucratic positions in the colonial administrations, were always
aware that the Anglo-rulers saw them as ethnically inferior.
This, necessarily produced a sense of inferiority because
being in a "backward" (or intermediary) position produced a
feeling of being "weak and helpless" vis-a-vis the "advanced"
group (Horowitz, 1985: 170). It also produced a form of self-
stereotyping in which members of the "backward" groups adopted
compliant personalities characterized by unassertiveness, an
unambitious demeanour and the assumption that others were
more intelligent, better educated and more worthwhile (Horowitz,
1985: 170~171).
Besides being psychologically unsettling, exclusion from
the "advanced" group produced feelings of env)T, insecurity and
deprivation (Iesudason, 1995: 7). It was this envy, insecurity and
deprivation that was to have such profound effects on subsequent
socio-political developments in Malaysia and South Africa because
it produced what might be termed "catch-up nationalism" - e.g.
Afrikaner nationalism, Malay nationalism and South African black
nationalism.
In the final analysis, these catch-up nationalisms (with their
policies of apartheid, Bumiputera and affirmative action) are all
essentially attempts by groups "psychologically damaged" by the
Anglo colonial ranking system to re-arrange the ranking order
and so achieve the "same recognition" accorded to the "advanced"
group (Horowitz, 1985: 165). They are nationalisms triggered by
"pain". This "pain dimension" is something that can potentially
distort the work of journalists in different ways.
Some foreign journalists trying to report on societies like
Malaysia and South Africa will simply fail to fully comprehend
the actions of players in such societies because they overlook the
pain dimension (most outside reporting of Afrikaner nationalism
fell into this category). On the other hand, for those foreign Anglo-
journalists (i.e. Australians and Americans) who do recognise the
pain (albeit from their "advanced" group position), "self-guilt" is
often the response. This distorts their reporting in a different way
- because they then become incapable of asking critical questions.
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Finally, local journalists can have their reports distorted in
a different way again because they may well be too enmeshed in
local ethnic issues and local mythologies to be in a position to
adequately grapple with such issues. So, in a sense, journalistic
reporting on such societies will probably always be compromised
by either one's own lived experience or lack of experience of such
race-ranked societies and I or the Empire's ranking system.
Perhaps such societies cannot be reported "properly"?
[esudason has noted that "deprived individuals and their
leaders, especially if they possess strong cultural and affective ties,
are prone to using the state to ... modify the opportunity structure
of society" (Jesudason, 1995: 7). The British created the ethnic
ranking system and the pain associated with being ranked badly.
Having done this, the conditions were created (in the many multi-
ethnic societies created by the British Empire) for one or other
ethnic group to seize state power in order to use the state for a
group-based socioeconomic catch-up policy. It would seem the
earliest such nationalist catch-up project was actually undertaken
(from the 1930s to the 1960s) by an intermediary ranked group,
namely Afrikaner nationalists in South Africa (see O'Meara, 1983;
and Louw,1994: 24 -27).
Apartheid was effectively an enormous race re-ranking and
"affirmative action" project designed to upgrade the intermediarily
ranked Afrikaners who had been impoverished by the Anglos after
the Boer War. Media reportage of apartheid was overwhelmingly
negative. By and large only Afrikaner journalists had anything
positive to say about apartheid, but then they were after all
deriving benefit from its modification of society's opportunity
structures.
Global coverage of apartheid was largely mediated through
the eyes of South African-Anglo journalists who overwhelmingly
opposed apartheid because it was modifying opportunity
structures to the disadvantage of Anglos (who constituted the
former elite). South African Anglo-journalists fed their particular
interpretation of apartheid to the rest of the Anglo world via
Reuters where it became enmeshed in an interesting way with the
old Empire race-ranking idea -- serving to confirm the notion of
retrogressive decline when Anglos did not run things.
However, in the contemporary post-colonial era it has been
some of the bottom ranked "backward" groups who have come to
use the state as a vehicle for modifying the opportunity structures
to their own advantage. Their resultant race-based socio-economic
policies have consequently, perhaps not surprisingly, taken on very
similar forms in places like Malaysia, South Africa and Fiji. In
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such places, the formerly bottom-ranked groups have sought to
re-rank themselves and simultaneously "punish" the formerly
"advanced" or intermediary groups. As might be expected, some
exchange of ideas and copycatism has even taken place, with South
African ANC personnel, for example, visiting Malaysia to learn
about the Bumiputera policy.
At the most elementary level, the contemporary race-based
policies of Bumiputera and affirmative action are the claim
(demand?) by "backward" groups that they now have a right to
preferential treatment (Horowitz, 1985: 174). This preferential
status has been associated with what has come to be termed "the
politics of entitlement" or a "our time has come" psychology. In
concrete terms, these policies use the state to radically improve
the life chances of members of the formerly "backward" groups,
and by extension, to diminish the life chances of the formerly
"advanced" or intermediary groups (or more specifically, to
diminish their children's life-chances). The media, supportive of
the new ruling-elite, set about justifying the adoption of such a
modified racial-ranking system and naturalising its outcome.
Malaysia's New Economic Policy (NEP) launched in 1970
is classic contemporary example of a "backward II group acting to
modify sodo-economic opportunity structures in favour of one
particular ethnic group in society. The NEP set racial targets so
that by 1990, 30 percent of Malaysian corporate ownership was to
be held by Bumiputeras ("sons of the soil") - i.e. ethnic Malays; up
from 1.9 percent Malay ownership in 1970 (Iesudason, 1995: 3-4).
This was to be achieved by protecting ethnic-Malays against
competition from non-Malays, especially Chinese-Malaysians Gin,
1992: 59). It was protection developed in accordance with Prime
Minister Mahathir's solution to the "Malay Dilemma" which
portrayed Malays as "weaklings" (Jin, 1992: 59), or to use
Horowitz's term, a "backward" group who need a leg-up.
A repeat performance of Malaysia's 1970-80'5 catch-up
policies can be seen in 1990'5 South Africa, something that the
world's media seems to have completely ignored in their rush to
proclaim a "non-racial" future for South Africa. Post-1994 the new
African National Congress government has adopted affirmative
action as the states' central policy. Although the term affirmative
action appears to have been borrowed from the USA, its
application in South Africa is much more akin to the old apartheid
patronage system, or to the Malaysian catch-up nationalist model
rather than to the liberal American model.
In terms of the South African model of affirmative action,
the ANC has made it clear that it expects a rapid change in the
ownership and management structure of companies so as that
what are called "the demographic realities of South Africa" are
26 AsiaPacific MediaEducator, Issue No.2, Jan-June 1997
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reflected in future employment and ownership patterns, and "past
disadvantages" are redressed (Press clipping. 1996d).
Further, black people (usually called "the majority" 2 or the
"previously disadvantaged group") are to be given preferential
employment opportunities, university placements, etc.; while
whites (usually pejoratively referred to as "the elite" or "the
minority"), are to be "penalized". Businesses seen to be "too white"
are not given government contracts (Press clipping,1996a; 1996f).
Indians and coloureds occupy a somewhat ambiguous
position in the New South Africa -- they are not specifically
"targeted" as "the elite", but in reality seem to be experiencing
similar rates of' "penalization". Coloured and Indian anger at such
"penalization" has, however, led the ANC to give attention to this
in its latest legislation (Press clipping,1996c).
The ANC government has also set about replacing white-
employees with black employees in the civil service, state-
enterprises, police and armed forces, and the state has intervened
to shift resources out of the "non-black 11 (white, coloured and
Indian) sector and into the "black sector". This has caused
particular resentment in coloured and Indian communities.' By
1996 the results of affirmative action are already visible: the
proportion of general jobs occupied by black people has risen by
50% since 1993, and is expected to rise by another 62% over the
next three years (Press clipping,1996g). The "increases are even
more dramatic in the case of managers and professionals" (Press
clipping,1996g). Many whites who are "feeling the job squeeze"
are opting to emigrate (Press clipping,1996g; 1996h).
The discourses used to justify both Bumiputera and
affirmative action overlap to a considerable extent. Firstly, both
the Malay and SAblack nationalist ruling elites mobilise discourses
that justify their race-based policies as merely unpleasant
temporary expedients, designed to rectify imbalances derived from
past-wrongs and so overcome their "backward" status. This
"temporary" discourse ignores the way in which racial-patronage
structures are being built which seem virtually certain to congeal
into fixed social infrastructures.
Secondly, both catch-up nationalisms reveal their roots in
the "pain" of the past by now asserting a rejection of things
"Western" (in Malaysia) or "Eurocentric" (in South Africa). Thirdly,
both the Malay and SA black nationalists seek to re-rank their
citizens in terms of claims about a prior ownership of the land --
i.e. "who was here first" (Said, 1992: 274). It is a logic that ranks
"immigrant groups" (i.e. Chinese and whites) into a necessarily
secondary citizenship status (Said, 1992: 261). (Afrikaner
nationalists mobilised a similar "here before you" discourse against
Anglo-rule). These nationalist re-rankings have thus tended to
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justify their political actions, in part, by mobilising a rescripted
(and often distorted):' history which benefits the ruling elite's
constituency. Such nationalist ruling elites then try to popularise
their re-scriptings and new social myths through the mass media.
The extent to which they are successful will, to a considerable
extent, depend on how compliant "tame" local media workers are
in disseminating and popularising the new script, and/ or in not





By building on notions of past injustice, the discourses of
Bumiputera and affirmative action, effectively seem to preclude
a rational discussion of contemporary injustice. By focussing on
race, "historical legacies", and the "evils of the pastil, these
discourses s~rve to disguise the class bias and socio-economic
distortions of present day policies. The question is -- why have
journalists working in these societies done so little to strip away
such disguises and discuss the present day distortions?
Journalistic acquiescence to ruling elite needs in such societies is
perhaps an issue that deserves investigation.
Tentatively, it might be suggested that local journalists
acquiesce for one of four possible reasons - they may belong to
the "lucky" ethnic group deriving benefit from such racial-policies.
Secondly, members of "unlucky" ethnic groups may be fearful (of,
for example, losing their jobs) if they speak out.
Thirdly, some journalists from downwardly-ranked groups
feel "guilt" and hence support the re-ranking exercise (a position
seemingly shared by many foreign Anglo-journalists). Fourthly,
some journalists function as the "organic intellectuals" of groups
allied to the new ethno-elites (e.g. the Malaysian-Chinese or SA-
Anglo business elite who derive economic benefit from the
Malaysian or South African regimes). At any rate, the end result
would seem to be a silence about certain kinds of ethno-
nationalism and the racial discrimination flowing from such
nationalisms."
Simply put, contemporary Malaysia and South Africa are
being re-constructed upon a sectionalist nationalist interpretation
of the past such that their futures are ironically locked into a
perpetuation of their racist pasts. Past distortions are modified
into new distortions. The racial ranking may be changed, but
ironically the race / class logic introduced by the British remains
unchallenged.
In the case of both Malaysia and South Africa all that is
happening is that a new (minority) privileged group is being
created ._- an ethnic-based bourgeoisie. Claims that the NEP
benefits "Malays" or that affirmative action benefits "blacks" is
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nonsense. Rather these policies are to the benefit of a small group
of Malays and a small group of black South Africans - a fact that
the global Anglo-journalist community seems quite content to
ignore (perhaps because it serves to confirm a deep-seated and
unacknowledged class consciousness about social organization?)
As Yukio Ikemoto has noted of Malaysia, "the NEP ...
neglected the inequality within each race .... In the urban areas, for
example, the impact of the NEP was that well-educated Malays
now earned more than well-educated Chinese, while poor Malays
earned less than poor Chinese" (as quoted in Brown, 1994: 246).
The same pattern is emerging in 1990's with regard to black and
white South Africans.
Frantz Fanon's (1963: 149-156) description of the 19601s
emergence of black middle class comprador groups in post-
independence Africa is of great relevance in understanding this
process except that Fanon ignored the dimensions of "ethnicity"
and "catch-up" nationalism. Both the Malay and SA-black
nationalist ruling elites have set about the deliberate race-based
construction of an ethnic bourgeoisie.
In 1996 a senior ANC politician, [abu Moleketi, said it was
now state policy to build a "patriotic black bourgeoisie" (Malala,
1996). In the case of Malaysia this project was associated with the
rapid expansion of the state enterprise sector which effectively
provided well-paid "sheltered" employment for Malays
(Iesudason, 1995:4). Further, the private sector was forced to
employ Malays in high-level positions and companies were forced
to take Malay business partners on board Gin, 1992:60;and Bowie,
1995: 32-33). This has led to the practice called "Ali-Babaism"
(Bowie, 1995:40) - i.e. taking on board "token" Malays and over-
promoting Malays to comply with the Bumiputera policy.
In contemporary South Africa, the equivalent pejorative
term for "Ali-Baba" is "an affirmative" (meaning "well-paid token
black"). In South Africa, the process of transferring capital into
black hands has been accelerated by the creation of a holding
company (with strong ANC links) called New African Investments
Limited (NAIL) and the National Empowerment Consortium
(1996k). And just as the Anglo-colonial media failed to
fundamentally question the ethno-class character of the old social
order, so the contemporary SA media plays a similarly supportive
role.
A key feature of the Bumiputera and affirmative action
policies are that they are both effectively patronage systems. Both
the new ethnic-based bourgeois groups being formed rely on the
power and patronage of the state for their status and wealth. Of
course, the political ruling elites in Malaysia and South Africa, in
turn, are locking themselves into a (permanent?) relationship with
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these new bourgeoisie groups. Dispensing patronage will
presumably become central to maintaining power (Iesudason,
1995: 11). [in, in fact, has described how the Malaysian ruling
elite has already discovered how patronage has shifted alignments
within its constituency and hence impacted on its future actions
(Jin, 1992: 62-63). (The National Party had much the same
experiences within its Afrikaner constituency as a result of the
impact of apartheid patronage).
Ultimately, catch-up nationalism's system of patronage
complicates the ruling group's relationship with its ethnic
constituency because patronage splits the "chosen" ethnic group
into two: a lucky minority becomes the ethnic bourgeoisie, while
the rest derive no (or very little) economic benefit. Ironically,
however, even those "backward" group members not deriving
material benefits from Bumiputera and affirmative action appear
not to oppose these policies (at least in the short-to-medium term).
This seems to happen for two reasons.
Firstly, members of the "backward" groups who continue
to be poor derive a sort of "psychological benefit" from seeing
some members of their ethnic group "make it" - somehow "group
worth" is improved, and the pain of being ranked "backward"
within the colonial system is lessened when other Malays or blacks
are seen to succeed. Secondly, even if one does not benefit
presently, there is always the hope that one's children will be in
the next wave to derive benefit (see [esudason, 1995: 13).
Of course, if catch-up nationalism is to have any success,
the new ethnic ruling elites need the cooperation of sections of
the old "advanced" and intermediary groups - or at the very least
requires their acquiescence. In fact, what seems to have happened
in both Malaysia and South Africa is that the new ethnic (Malay
and black) bourgeoisie have effectively forged an alliance with a
section of the old elite.
As Brown has noted, the NEP actually hurt poor Malays
more than it hurt wealthy Chinese because the wealthy Chinese
(who got richer under NEP) were effectively bought into an
alliance with the new ethnic Malay elite (Brown, 1994: 247-248;
219). In part this alliance is constructed upon the fact that both
the ethnic Malay and Chinese business sectors derive benefit from
being protected against foreign capital (jesudason, 1995: 9).
The racial re-rankings being implemented in Malaysia and
South Africa were both the result of crises in racially-ordered
capitalist societies -- namely, the 1969 race riots in Malaysia and
the 1980'santi-apartheid uprising in South Africa. Both re-ranking
processes ultimately form part of an attempt to stabilize the basic
outlines of the old (racial-) capitalist-system introduced by the
British. Both the New South Africa and the NEP have simply
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been strategies to co-opt new ethno-elites into the old system and
so end these crises (which is advantageous for both local and global
capital).
For non-elite Malays and black South Africans little will
change. In order to camouflage this new ethno-class reality, the
Malay ruling elite, for example, eventually mobilised the "ideology
of Islam" to pacify non-elite ethnic Malays (Brown, 1994: 248). This,
of course required the cooperation (or at least acquiescence) of
media workers and the intelligentsia across the whole ethnic
spectrum.
A remarkably similar picture is emerging in South Africa
where the new black bourgeoisie are effectively in alliance with
sections of the white-Anglo business elite. The SA ideologies of
"nation building" and "developmentalism" are being used to deflect
attention away from the emerging new inequalities. And the South
African media are generally acquiescing to the "ideological needs"
of the new ruling elite. The media owned by the Anglo-elite and
the state-run South African Broadcasting Corporation are proving
especially central in promoting discourses favourable to the new
regime (see Louw, 1996: 79-81).
In general then, there are more continuities than
discontinuities between the past and present in societies like
Malaysia and South Africa. It seems the Anglo race/ class-ranking
model has tremendous resilience, and that it will long outlive the
Empire. It would consequently seem that for Malaysia and South
Africa the future looks a lot like the past -- these are societies
inherently patterned and skewed by race / class hierarchies. They
consequently remain tense societies, since within racially-ranked
communities there will always be losers -- whose moods swing
between feeling crushed, resentful, sullen, bitter or angry.
What is interesting, is the extent to which both the local
(Malay and SA) media and the global media are seemingly down-
playing the resentments and anger of downwardly-ranked groups
like the Malaysian Chinese and white-South Africans. The
resultant skewed media picture emerging from such societies
throws up a number of questions about the journalistic practices
of those reporting on such countries.
Reporting on societies in which ethno-elites are
implementing a racial re-ranking program has, so far, thrown up
three main responses. Firstly, some journalists have chosen to
actively support such race policies, often because they are members
of the group deriving benefit from the re-ranking (e.g. Afrikaner
journalists in the 1950's-70's; Malay journalists in the 1970's-80's;
and black journalists in the 1990's). Jesudason (1995:11) has noted
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that supporting such policies does not necessarily make the
individual a racist in his/her personal-life - e.g. at the micro level
individuals often mix together well.
However, when it comes to the macro-level, the same
individual can support ethnic group actions which maximise
advantages for his/her own group. Some Afro-Asian journalists
who have practiced pro-government reporting have, however,
deflected attention away from their personal self-interest in such
policies by referring instead to the principles of "development"
journalism or the New World Information Order (Masmoudi, 1979).
On the other hand, there are some journalists and foreign
correspondents, (who are not members of recipient groups), who
have supported such race-based policies either because of a
personal "guilt" concerning past racial injustice, and/or because
they see such interventions as a practical means for diffusing racial
tensions in certain contexts (e.g. many SA-Anglo journalists in the
1990's appear to be adopting such a position).
A second journalistic response has been to oppose such re-
rankings and to work actively to expose the racism of such policies.
Such moral crusading or "exposure" journalism is undertaken
either because of an in-principle ethical opposition to race-based
state policies (e.g. much international media opposition to
I apartheid), or because one is a member of a group disadvantaged
by such a policy (e.g. many SA-Anglo journalists in the 1950's-60's).
A third journalistic response has been a sort of "refusal" to
deal with the racism inherent in such ethnic re-ranking programs
- the "turning a blind eye" approach. Many foreign correspondents
(e.g. Australians) have responded to Bumiputera and SA
affirmative action in this way. The refusal to discuss the racial
underpinnings of such policies seems to be tied to either a "guilt"
concerning past treatment of "backward'! ranked groups, or because
of a fear of offending trading partners (e.g.Malaysia and Australia),
or perhaps a mixture of both of these. It would be interesting to
know how many foreign correspondents turn a blind eye because
of pressure from their home-based editors.
In all of these forms of journalism, something is hidden from
the audience. The nature of what can be and what is hidden, differs
for internal and external audiences. When it comes to the
journalism practised inside such race-based societies, the objective
of those journalists supportive of the local regime will be fourfold.
Firstly, to try and "naturalize" and "normalise" such race-
based policies for both the benefactors and victims of the state's
race-based policies. Secondly, to try and "atomise" the responses
of the new downwardly ranked (i.e. make any pain felt seem
"personal" and "individual") and so to prevent, as far as possible,
the downwardly ranked from recognising how widespread
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opposition to such racial policies may be. After all, any recognition
that one's own "pain" and "anger' is felt by many others could
lead to the emergence of a collective counter-reaction.
Thirdly, to hide from the recipient (upwardly ranked) ethnic
groups the resentments and "pain" of those ethnic groups suffering
from the state's policies. 6 Fourthly, to hide any negative socio-
economic consequences of the government's race-based policies
(see Bowie, 1995: 40; and [esudason, 1995: 7). In short, "the
negative" will be avoided in favour of a "development" or
"sunshine" journalism which tries to paper over the cracks and
focus on the "positive". Ultimately, such journalism is counter
productive because it serves to blind the ruling elite themselves,
and so prevents them from taking timely corrective action for socio-
economic problems that may emerge (Iesudason, 1995:15).
Of course, not all journalists in societies implementing race-
based policies will be happy to promote the case of the government
and its ethnic constituency. Journalists reporting "negatively" have
tended to face either direct or indirect government pressure. In
the case of Malaysia, direct pressure has been forthcoming -- with
the government enacting legislation which effectively prevents the
media from addressing the state's race-based policies (McDaniel,
1994: 93-97) 7.
In the case of contemporary South Africa, however, a more
indirect approach to pressuring the media has been adopted - i.e.
instilling "fear" through mobilising "threats" has been the ANC's
preferred approach. Thus both President Mandela and Deputy
President Mbeki have warned the press for "not representing the
views of the [black] majority" (see 1996j; and Ludski, 1996), and
for having "too white" an ownership and staffing structure
(Mandela, 1994).
There have been repeated statements that the media should
report the government more "positively", and much ANC/
government pressure to appoint black journalists (1996i; 1996n).
Journalists reporting the government "negatively" have been
attacked (1996)and "threats" have been made that the government
might become more proactive in promoting its interpretation of
the news (1996m).
At the same time, the state-owned broadcaster (SABC) has
actually set about changing its staff composition -1994-95 saw more
than 900 (mostly white) staffers leave the SABC while 68% of new
staff replacements were black (Press clipping. 19961). (Many of
the new non-black staff appointees were pro-ANC media activists
in the 1980's).
Foreign journalists covering such race-based societies face
a different set of pressures. In extreme cases, for example, foreign
journalists can face deportation for producing "negative" reports.
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Some journalists may consequently feel compelled to skew and!
or tone-down their reporting. However, skewed reporting can also
derive from other factors. For one thing an outside journalist is
more likely to mistake "bluster" and "symbolism" for "reality" -
hence, fine-sounding words from Mandela or Mahathir are perhaps
less transparent to an outsider (?)
Secondly, for foreign journalists, pain feltby minority groups
in Malaysia or South Africa is, after all, not "their pain" - and it
may well be easier to overlook such tricky issues, rather than trying
to explain to home-audiences some of the more complex sub-texts
within societies like Malaysia or South Africa (e.g. Cape coloured
politics in the 1990's).
Thirdly, of course, there are always (subtle) pressures
emanating from home-based editors - such as a preference for
"good news" stories from "post-apartheid South Africa"; or the
avoidance of negative stories on Malaysia that might give the
appearance that (Anglo) Australians retain a "colonial-arrogance"
toward their Asian neighbours.
Post-coloniality has produced some interesting challenges
and problems for media workers, not the least of which is the
reporting of race-based societies in the throes of dealing with their
colonial legacies. How should journalists respond to such complex
and tense societies? Should journalists "assist" governments in
the midst of difficult social transformations? Should journalists
consider the past when reporting on the present?
When it comes to the above sorts of questions, contemporary
Malaysia and South Africa might be seen to provide something of
a litmus test for journalistic practice and for those concerned with
media, media values and the training of future journalists. If
nothing else, hopefully, this article will at least have raised a few
questions that others will see as worthy of further debate.•
NOTES
1. The term kaffir was introduced to South Africa by Indonesian political
prisoners sent to Cape Town by the Dutch East India Company. (The
descendants of these people are today called Cape Malays). Initially,
the term kaffir was used to describe the indigenous Khoi-San (i.e.
Hottentots and Bushmen), who were, of course, non-Muslim.
However, over time it came to describe indigenous black people.
2. "Majoritarianism" is central to an intertwined set of discourses that the
ANC is using to justify building its race-based patronage system. The
conflation of "majority" with "democracy" has also proved helpful
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when selling these race-based policies to foreign journalists from
societies like the USA and Australia.
3. A common rallying call in today's coloured politics is: "In the old South
Africa we were not white enough. Now we are not black enough".
The bulk of the coloured and Indian community have thus, somewhat
ironically, shifted their political allegiance - and today support the
National Parly (the party that invented apartheid, which used to
discriminate against coloureds and Indians!).
4. An example of how the nationalist "who was here first" history is
selectively constructed is the way in which SA black nationalist
historiography now chooses to ignore the way in which black people
were also immigrants I settlers still engaged in the process of conquest I
when whites first settled Cape Town in 1652. Approximately one-
third of South Africa was never settled by black people, but rather
occupied by the (non-black) Khoi-San who intermarried with white
people to form the coloured group. Black people only began migrating
to the Western Cape in significant numbers in the mid-1980s. Under
affirmative action, black people are effectively now migrating to parts
of the country they never before occupied, and are being awarded
choice employment opportunities there. This has become an issue of
considerable irritation to Cape coloureds, who see these black people
as "settlers". Given that the "who was here first" principle is so
important within the black nationalist-logic, this Khoi-Sari/ coloured
issue is being ignored in today's reconstruction of South Africa's past.
A similar set of silences is apparent within the construction of
"Malayness/Bumiputeraness" (see Kessler, 1992: 139-140).
5. The response of Anglo-journalists to contemporary Malay and SA black
nationalism seems to be informed, in some way, by a residual logic
derived from the old Empire racial-ranking system. The "guilt" felt by
many Anglo-journalists is extended to those groups ranked
"backward", but not to intermediary groups (e.g. Chinese or
Afrikaners). Thus the catch-up nationalisms and the racist-logic
associated with "backward"-ranked groups like ethnic-Malays or black
South Africans is seemingly acceptable (andl or "excused"). But when
an intermediary group has tried to re-rank itself against Anglo-rule -
e.g. the Malaysian-Chinese communists (1948-60) or Afrikaner
nationalists (1930's to 1950's) - this has not been acceptable or "excused"
in any way.
6. One might ask why Anglo-journalists are not asking the same sort of
critical questions about the racism encoded into Bumiputera or
affirmative action that they asked about apartheid? Why, for example,
are Anglo-journalists so silent about the discrimination currently
suffered by South African coloureds? (also a group the Empire ranked
in an "intermediary" position). Anglo-journalists who did a wonderful
job exposing the evils of apartheid seem to have developed a blind-
spot when it comes to the racial-policies in contemporary South Africa
or Malaysia. Anglo "guilt" then seems to be ranked hierarchically -
and it is a ranking that parallels (inversely) the old Empire-racial
ranking system.
7. Under apartheid, for example, the average white person never had to
confront the pain and deprivation suffered by black people. This was
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obviously helpful for the ruling elite, who consequently never had to
deal with critical questions from within their own ethnic-constituency.
8. Contemporary Malaysian media legislation, in fact, has some
remarkable similarities to the media laws of the old apartheid regime.
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